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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
\T_A .. UGHN L. \\rARR, et al., 
- Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
THE \'""_A_N KLEECK-BACON 
INVEST:JIENT COMPANY, and 
THE \-.-AN KLEECK MORTGAGE 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
JAY LARSE.N, 
Appellant and Intervener. 
Case No. 
7872 
REPLY BRIEF OF: DEFENDANTS. 
AND APPELLANTS 
AND 
JAY LARSEN, APPELLANT AND 
INTERVENER 
POINT I. 
BOTH VAN KLEECK COMPANIES WERE QUALIFIED 
TO DO BUSINESS IN UTAH WHEN THE WARR DEED 
WAS ACKNOWLEDGED AND DELIVERED TO THE VAN 
KLEECK-BACON INVESTMENT COMPANY. 
Plaintiffs and respondents in their brief dwell upon 
the corporate status over the years of the Van Kleeck 
Companies both in Utah and Colorado and, although 
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2 
they do not come right out and say so, are apparently 
attempting to convey the impression that when the 
vVarr Deed was delivered neither company was qualified 
to transact business in Utah. This impression 1s con-
trary to the facts. 
The Warr Deed (R. 24-5), which on its face states, 
"This deed is not intended as a mortgage," was dated 
April 19, 1921, acknowledged May 14, 1921, and after 
such acknowledgment duly delivered to the Investment 
Company and recorded. 
At the bottom of page 6 of their brief plaintiffs 
state, "The Van Kleeck Mortgage Company qualified 
to do business in the State of Utah on the 2nd day of. 
May "1921." Again on page 35 of their brief plaintiffs 
state that the Investment Company, the Grantee under 
the W arr deed, was formed in 1901 for a period of 20 
years and that its corporate existence expired in 1921 
just a few months after the takilng of the purported deed 
which was in fact only a. mortgage. 
The fact is, therefore, and cannot be denied that on 
the date the Warr deed was acknowledged and delivered 
to the Investment Company both of the Van Kle.eck 
Companies were in good standing and duly qualified to 
transact business in Utah. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT 
JAY LARSEN IS NOT A NECESSARY AND INDISPENS-
ABLE PARTY TO THIS ACTION. 
F'rom page 37 to page 48, with a significant absence 
of le~gal authorities, plaintiffs argue that Jay Larsen is 
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not a necessary and indispensable party to this action 
and that his title has not been clouded for the reason 
that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the surface 
rights and 'vater stock involved in this action. 
On pages 39 and 40 plaintiffs cite Jones on Mort-
gages, Glen on lllortgages, two Ne·w York cases and 
one \V-ashington case, holding that Jay Larsen, as a 
bona fide purchaser for value, might take free and clear 
of a Court decree adjudging the W arr deed to be an 
equitable mortgage. These authorities may be of some 
value in assisting Jay Larsen to prevail over plaintiffs 
but they do not show that he is disp·ensable or that his 
record title is still free and clear. 
We first point out that Jay Larsen's title has defi-
nitely been clouded by the judgment of the court below 
and because he holds under a warranty deed from the 
defaulting defendant, The Van Kleeck-Bacon Invest-
ment Company, is entitled under the authorities to 
intervene in the action. An abstract of title of the prop-
erty would now show two owners of the water stock and 
surface rights, Jay Larsen and plaintiffs. 
In the court below plaintiffs asked for a judgment 
clouding Jay Larsen's title and they got it. It is now 
too late for them to say, having gotten it, that they 
didn't want it in the first place. Plaintiffs' recorded 
judgment speaks louder than plaintiffs' unrecorded brief. 
Jay Larsen has the right to intervene here and have 
that judgment removed as a cloud on his title. 
We next point out tha.t plaintiffs' contention that 
Jay Larsen, as a bona fide purchaser, took free and 
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clear of the so-called infirmities of the deed absolute 
from the W arrs to the Van Kleeck Companies is directly 
contrary to the holding of this Court in First National 
Bank of Price vs. Parker, 57 Utah 290, 194 Pac. 661, 
12 A.L.R. 1373. 
The attention of the Court is directed to the fact 
that the court below, in paragraph 2 of its judgment, 
decreed tha.t the W arr deed was not only an outlawed 
mortgage but also, in paragraph 4, decreed that the 
purported mortgage and conV'eyance to the Van Kleeck 
Companies was absolutely "void" because the companies 
were not qualified to do business in Utah. In this con-
nection we refer to Dunn vs. Utah Serum Co., 65 Utah 
527, 238 Pac. 245, which held that a mortgage taken in 
Utah by a non-qualified foreign corporation was abso-
lutely void in an action brought to foreclose the same. 
The decision of the court in the Serum case was largely 
based upon the prior holding of this court in the Parker 
case referred to above. The. Parker case held that a 
bona fide transferee for value and holder in due course, 
whether by delivery or endorsement of a note payable 
to bearer, could not enforce such note against the maker 
of the note notwithstanding the provisions of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Act where the payee of the. note was 
a corporation not properly qualified to transact business 
in Utah. The Court held that the note was wholly 
void, not only in the hands of the: non-qualified corpora-
tion payee itself, but also in the hands of its assignee 
or anyone deriving any interest or title therein from 
such non-qualified corporation. 
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The Court stated: 
HThe language of the act is not only that the 
contract shall be wholly void in the hands of 
the corporation and its assigns, but it goes farther 
than any of the other statutes relied upon, in 
that it makes the contract void in the hands of 
anyone obtaining any right or title through or 
from such non-complying corporation." 
The Court below having decreed the conveyance 
from the W arrs to the Investment Company to be abso-
lutely void, Jay Larsen could get no better title to the 
surface rights and water stock from the Investment 
Company than he could get to cattle purchased for value 
without notice from a thief. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO SHOW THAT DE-
FENDANTS HAVE NO MERITORIOUS DEFENSE. 
It is, of course, elementary that the merits of the 
case are not to be tried on a motion to set aside a 
default judgment. All that is necessary is that the 
Court satisfy itself that the defendant has on support-
ing affidavits a meritorious defense and interposes an 
answer which if true would constitute a defense to plain-
tiffs' claim. 
Upon a trial of the case we will show that the 
original note executed by the W arrs to the Mortgage 
Company was a Denver note, payable, effected, delivered, 
and to be performed in D·enver. In extinguishment of 
this debt, and not to secure any other or different debt, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
the W arrs deeded the property by Warranty Deed to 
the Investment Company at the request of the Mortgage 
Con1pany. It is not unusual for a creditor to take prop-
erty from his debtor in extinguishment of the debt and 
to direct the debtor to convey the property to some 
designated third person. The reason why the Mortgage 
Company requested the W arrs to deed the property to 
the Investment Company was to keep the mortgages on 
the property intact and prevent their common law me~r­
ger. It hoped eventually to find another purchaser of the 
land who might assume the mortgages. 
On pages 29 and 30 of plaintiffs' brief much point 
is n1ade of the Dunn v. Utah Serum Co. case. In that 
case (see page 541 of opinion) both note and mortgage_ 
"were made and entered into and by their terms are to 
be performed within this state" at a time when the 
mortgagee was not properly qualified but was in fact 
engaged in doing business in Utah. In the ca.se at bar 
the note, as heretofore pointed out, was a Denver note, 
payable, effected, and to be performed in Denver. We 
likewise emphatically deny and on a trial will prove, 
if the point is relevant at all, that the mortgage com-
pany was not doing business at the time the original 
mortgages were exeeuted so as to attach any infirmities 
against such mortgages. In any event and notwithstand-
ing that the Court below in error declared the Warr 
conveyance void, the Dwnn case is not applicable to the 
case at bar for the reason that the mortgage company 
as mortgagee did not and never has come into the· Courts 
of Utah to foreclose its mortgages against the Warrs. 
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The Serlun case, altl1ough holding a mortgage void when 
the non-qualifying foreign corporation comes into the 
Courts of this State to foreclose its mortgage, never 
has been held to prevent a mortgagor from voluntarily 
recogniZing his obligation and paying his debt volun-
tarily. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE DEED 
ABSOLUTE FROM THE WARRS SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
AS A MORTGAGE. 
On page 32, plaintiffs' refer to the case of Bybee v. 
Stt(;a.rt, 112 Utah 462, 189 Pac. (2) 118. This case; merely 
held that a deed absolute should be construed as a mort-
gage where it is shown that the deed was given to secure 
a debt. This law is also expressed in Brow·n vs. Skeen, 
89 Utah 568, 58 Pac. (2) 24, and in Duerden vs. Solomon, 
33 Utah 468, 94 Pac. 978. 
As heretofore pointed ·out, this doctrine is com-
pletely inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple 
reason that the Warranty Deed from the W arrs to the 
Investment Company was given, not to secure a debt, 
but to extinguish an antecedent debt owing from the 
W arrs to the Mortgage Company. The case at har, we 
respectfully submit, is governed by the decision of this 
Court in Thornley Land and Livestock Co. v. Gailey, 
105 Utah 519, 143 Pac. (2) 283. The omission of this 
case in plaintiffs' brief is significant. In the Thornley 
case this Court held that a deed absolute accompanied by 
an agreement to redeem or buy the land back within 
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one year should be construed, not as a mortgage, but as 
a conditional_ sale, where it appears, among other things, 
that the deed was given to extinguish an earlier indebt-
edness evidenced by mortgage. The Court stated : 
"He already had a mortgage, so what would 
be gained by a deed absolute if· it were to be 
construed as an equitable mortgage and require 
foreclosure." 
F·or other cases on this point, we refer the· Court 
to 79 A.L.R. 937 and the~ annotation contained therein 
entitled, "Deed absolute on its face, with contemporane-
ous agreement for option for re-purchase by Grantor 
as a mortgage vel non." 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. M. GILMOUR, 
FRANK A. JOHNSON, 
DEY, HOPP AUGH, MARK & 
JOHNSON, 
Attorneys for Defend(}Jnts 
and Appellants, 
903 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
CLYDE s.. JOHNSON, 
Attorney for JAY LARSEN, 
A p·p-ell(JJYt.t and I nter·vene:r, 
Vernal, Utah. 
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